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THE TERMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES-
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES INCOME TAX CONVENTION:
A FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY
MARK B. SCHOELLER*
1. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1987, the United States gave notice that the United
States-Netherlands Antilles Income Tax Convention (the "Antilles
Treaty" or the "Treaty")1 would be terminated on January 1, 1988.2
While the notice of termination was modified on July 10, 1987,' the
U.S. action nonetheless had serious implications for the Netherlands
Antilles (the "Antilles" or the "Islands"),- the Eurobond Market and
the international investment community's perception of U.S. tax policy.
In light of these effects, the termination of the Antilles Treaty is ex-
posed as a tax policy failure for the United States.
The termination resulted from the desire of the United States to
end treaty shopping and tax evasion in the Antilles.5 However, the ter-
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1. Convention With Respect to Taxes on Income, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-
Netherlands, 62 Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1855 (extended to the Netherlands Antilles by
Protocol, June 15, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 3696, T.I.A.S. No. 3366; amended by Protocol, Oct.
23, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 1900, T.I.A.S. No. 5665; modified by Convention, Dec. 30, 1965,
17 U.S.T. 896, T.I.A.S. No. 6051) [hereinafter Antilles Treaty].
2. Van Kempen, International Tax Developments: Netherlands, 15 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 450, 455 (1987).
3. The United States excluded Article VIII of the Antilles Treaty, which per-
tains to interest payments, from the scope of the June 29th termination notice. Id.
4. The Antilles consists of two groups of islands which are part of the Kingdom
of the Netherlands. The Windward Islands (Sint Eustatius, Sint Maarten, Saba) are
located east of Puerto Rico, and the Leeward Islands (Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao) are
located just northwest of Venezuela. The Antilles covers a land area approximately
one-third the size of Rhode Island and has a population of approximately 245,000. The
capital city and financial center is Willemstad on Curacao. Tax Evasion Through the
Netherlands Antilles and Other Tax Haven Countries: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 794-96 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hearings];
Dilworth, Tax Reform Act of 1984-Netherlands Antilles-Effect of the Repeal of
the Withholding Tax on Portfolio Interest Payments to Foreign Investors, 15 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 111, 112 n.7 (1985). Recently, Aruba has obtained "status aparte"
within the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and therefore, has relative independence from
the rest of the Antilles. Van Kempen, supra note 2, at 455.
5. See Johnson, Antilles Treaty Termination Favored, But Period of Uncer-
tainty in Bond Market Lies Ahead, 36 TAX NOTEs 127, 129 (1987).
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mination virtually ignored important policy considerations, such as the
promotion of foreign investment in the United States and the U.S. in-
terest in the economic and political stability of the Antilles.6 An analy-
sis of the relationship between the United States and the Antilles dem-
onstrates that the United States improperly weighed the pertinent
factors before terminating the Antilles Treaty. A better balancing of the
policy considerations would have supported a less drastic alternative for
dealing with abuses of the Antilles Treaty.
This comment examines the decision to terminate the Antilles
Treaty and suggests areas in which the United States did not properly
consider the potential effects of the termination. Section 2 of this com-
ment provides a description of the Antilles' status as a tax haven. Sec-
tion 3 outlines the provisions of the Antilles Treaty and the subsequent
emergence of Antillean finance subsidiaries. Section 4 demonstrates
how the Antilles was used for tax evasion and treaty shopping, and it
suggests that an effective exchange of information program is the best
way to deal with tax evasion. Section 5 analyzes the effects of the
Treaty's termination on the Eurobond Market, the Antilles and the
United States. Section 6 discusses the alternatives to the outright termi-
nation of the Treaty and advocates that the adoption of some alterna-
tive would have been preferable. Finally, Section 7 states the conclusion
that the termination of the Antilles Treaty constitutes a failure of U.S.
tax policy.
2. THE ANTILLES AS A TAX HAVEN
All tax havens7 share certain common features: (1) low or zero tax
rates; (2) minimal currency exchange regulations and restrictions; (3)
commercial and banking confidentiality laws; (4) a record of political
stability and government policy favoring foreign investment; and (5) ef-
ficient travel and telephone systems in conjunction with good business
facilities.' Tax havens can be characterized as pure havens,9 liberal
6. See generally Belotsky, The Prevention of Tax Havens Via Income Tax Trea-
ties, 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 43, 97 (1987) (indicating that such factors should be con-
sidered in determining the objectives of U.S. tax policy).
7. Tax havens are countries in which foreigners can gain relief from the burdens
of their domestic tax system. U.S. ownership and direct investment in tax havens grew
five fold between 1968 and 1978. Growing Use of Tax Havens Is Serious Problem,
Says IRS, 151 J. AcCT. 22 (March 1981). "Tax havens have their origins buried deep
in the past. They vie in age with the world's oldest profession; and the pendulum of
their respectability has swung through almost as wide an arc." C. DOGGART, TAX
HAVENS AND THEIR USES 1 (1979).
8. Irish, Tax Havens, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 449, 452-54 (1982).
9. A pure haven has no direct taxes on income, profits, capital gains or inheri-
tances, but it may have customs duties and property taxes. Vanatu and Nauru are
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havens, ° treaty havens, 1 or a combination of the forms.
The Antilles' status as a tax haven was assured by its commercial
secrecy laws," its sanctioning of anonymous "bearer share" corpora-
tions, its minimal tax rates for financial institutions, and the Treaty's
provisions which eliminated or reduced the U.S. tax on U.S. source
income.1 3 In order to benefit from tax haven opportunities, the Antil-
lean Government actively recruited well-trained personnel to manage
tax haven activities and spent over $100 million on improvements to
Willemstad's telephone and telex facilities.' 4 As a result of these efforts
and its relationship with the United States, the Antillean Government
has generated a large percentage of its revenue in recent years from the
taxes and fees paid by financial entities resident in the Antilles.' 5
The existence of tax havens is inevitable, and one can predict
which countries will become tax havens by analyzing their tax treaties.
The problem with tax havens arises when the treaties are grossly
abused such that the abuses outweigh the benefits. 6 While most ob-
servers agree that the revenue lost due to tax havens cannot be esti-
mated accurately, indirect evidence indicates that the United States'
losses are not as great as the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
believes.'"
examples of pure havens. Id. at 454-56.
10. A liberal haven has some direct taxes but provides favorable treatment for
international investment activities. Hong Kong, Panama and Ireland are examples of
liberal havens. Id. at 456-58.
11. A treaty haven has a treaty or usually a network of treaties which provide
nonresidents with favorable tax treatment. Id. at 459.
12. The Antilles has no specific commercial secrecy statute. However, Articles
285 and 286 of the Netherlands Antilles Criminal Code make the divulgence of confi-
dential financial information punishable by imprisonment for up to six months or pay-
ment of a 600 guilder fine. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 518.
13. Id. at 569. "U.S. source income" is income received by foreigners from a
U.S. corporation or entity (e.g. interest, dividends, royalties, annuity payments). See id.
at 282-86.
14. Irish, supra note 8, at 454.
15. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 571. In 1982 for example, one-third of the
Antilles' federal budget, about $100 million, was paid by such sources. Id.
16. In a 1981 Report on tax havens, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") rec-
ommended the termination of treaties that are frequently abused and that provide only
small benefits for the United States. The Report identified such candidates for termina-
tion as treaties made with lightly populated countries which were once colonies of Eu-
ropean countries. Cathcart, International Developments: Use of Tax Havens by United
States Taxpayers, 5 REV. TAX'N INDIVIDUALs 383, 386-87 (1981).
17. While the IRS asserts that it cannot predict the revenue lost due to tax haven
abuse, it believes the amount to be in "the many billions of dollars." 1983 Hearings,
supra note 4, at 589; but cf. Irish, supra note 8, at 480 (stating that U.S. revenue loss
each year due to all tax havens is probably on the order of $1 billion). In 1982, a
Congressional staff estimated that the annual tax loss on dividends and interest paid to
unqualified recipients at foreign addresses is approximately $800 million. Improper
Use of Foreign Addresses To Evade U.S. Taxes: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
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The Antilles and Switzerland"8 share a reputation for maintaining
tax treaties with the United States that are frequently abused. 9 In fact,
available statistics demonstrate that both countries are major recipients
of U.S. source income.20 The reason the United States terminated the
Antilles treaty, while tolerating the treaty with Switzerland, may stem
from a Treasury Department determination that Switzerland, unlike
the Antilles, has attempted to combat tax evasion. 2
3. BACKGROUND OF THE ANTILLES TREATY
The United States and the Kingdom of the Netherlands executed
an income tax treaty in 1948 that allowed for the extension of the
treaty to overseas parts of either country upon request.22 In 1955, upon
the request of the Antillean Government, a protocol extended the treaty
to the Antilles.23 The treaty with respect to the Antilles was amended
by a protocol in 1963 and modified by a convention in 1965.24
3.1. Major Provisions of the Antilles Treaty
Under the Antilles Treaty, interest from a U.S. corporation paid
to a resident of the Antilles was exempt from U.S. tax unless 50% or
Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of the House Comm. on Government Op-
erations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 Hearings]. Some observers
predict that the termination of the Antilles Treaty should produce $100 million per
year in tax revenue. Revenue from Antilles Treaty Termination Could Fund R & D
Allocation Proposal, 36 Tax Notes 1120 (1987).
18. In addition to the Antilles, Switzerland has gained a reputation as a tax
haven. This status is the result of Switzerland's favorable location, excellent communi-
cation facilities, absence of currency exchange restrictions, stable political climate, lib-
eral investment policy and extensive network of tax treaties. Blackshaw, Switzerland:
Fiscal Advantages of Holding Domiciliary, and Other Special-Purpose Companies, 8
Bus. L. REV. 76, 76 (1987).
19. For the relevant Swiss Treaty, see Convention for the Avoidance of Double
Taxation, May 24, 1951, United States-Switzerland, 2 U.S.T. 1751, T.I.A.S. No. 2316
[hereinafter Swiss Treaty].
20. In 1980, a total of $6,576,375,477 in U.S. source income was paid to foreign
addresses with $632,163,000 paid to the Antilles and $998,477,779 paid to Switzer-
land. 1982 Hearings, supra note 17, at 275-82. In 1981, the total grew to
$9,561,489,336 with $1,398,528,123 paid to Antillean addresses and $1,203,878,212
paid to Swiss addresses. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 279. Of the amount paid to
Antillean addresses in 1981, about 55% ($793,630,151) came from unknown sources,
while about 17% ($210,450,451) of the amount paid to Swiss addresses came from
unknown sources. Id. at 306, 314. These statistics carry the caveat that, "[s]tudies indi-
cate that most U.S. income paid to Antilles [and Swiss] entities is not reported to IRS."
Id. at 569 (emphasis in original).
21. See infra notes 67-89 and accompanying text.
22. Antilles Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXVII, para. 1.
23. Antilles Treaty, supra note 1.
24. Id.
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more of the U.S. corporation was owned by an Antillean parent corpo-
ration.25 Dividends from a U.S. corporation paid to a resident of the
Antilles were taxed in the United States at a 15% rate ordinarily, and
at a 5% rate if 95% or more of the U.S. corporation was owned by an
Antillean parent corporation.26 Income from real property and interest
from a secured mortgage were taxed only in the country where the
property was located.2" The exchange of information provisions were
very sketchy and provided for the exchange of "necessary" information
for the prevention of fraud and for the administration of the Treaty.28
These provisions produced a favorable climate in the Antilles for the
emergence of finance subsidiaries to take advantage of the Treaty with
the United States.29
3.2. Antillean Finance Subsidiaries
Prior to 1984, the Internal Revenue Code imposed a 30% with-
holding tax on income derived by nonresidents and foreign corporations
from interest paid by U.S. borrowers.30 Over 200 U.S. corporations es-
tablished "paper corporations" in the Antilles to escape the withholding
tax on portfolio indebtedness interest."1 These finance subsidiaries
would borrow money from foreign investors and then in turn loan the
borrowed funds to the U.S. parent corporation. The interest paid by
the U.S. parent to the Antillean subsidiary was exempt from the with-
holding tax under Article VIII of the Antilles Treaty. Interest paid
by the subsidiary to the foreign investors was exempt from tax in the
Antilles under domestic law and from tax in the United States under
Article XII of the Antilles Treaty.'
The use of Antillean finance subsidiaries grew dramatically in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. From 1978 to 1982 for example, the
25. Id. art. VIII, para. 1.
26. Id. art. VII, para. 1.
27. Id. art. V.
28. Id. arts. XXI, XXIII. As a result of this ambiguous language, virtually no
information was exchanged between the IRS and the Antillean Government. 1983
Hearings, supra note 4, at 569.
29. See Dilworth, supra note 4, at 112.
30. I.R.C. § 871(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). A "withholding tax" requires the
payer of the income to withhold a part of the payment- on behalf of the IRS. See I.R.C.
§ 1441(a) (1982).
31. Dilworth, supra note 4, at 112. The corporations setting up subsidiaries in-
cluded Atlantic Richfield, American Telephone & Telegraph and Sears Roebuck. Fi-
alka, Closing a Loophole: Corporate Tax Haven in Netherlands Antilles Is Bracing
for a Disaster, Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 17, col. 1.
32. Dilworth, supra note 4, at 112.
33. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
34. Antilles Treaty, supra note 1, art. XII; Irish, supra note 8, at 460.
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amount of borrowing by U.S. corporations from Antillean subsidiaries
rose from $1 billion to $16 billion. 5 Finance subsidiaries provided the
further advantage of a reduced corporate tax rate in the Antilles. The
ordinary corporate tax rate in the Antilles is 27-35%, but the profits
tax on interest paid to finance subsidiaries is only 2.4-3%.36 Even at
those low rates, the Antillean Government has recently derived between
$50 million and $100 million in annual tax revenues from finance
subsidiaries."
The Eurobond Market38 was the main vehicle for the investments
of Antillean finance subsidiaries. Because debt instruments can gener-
ally be sold in international capital markets only if the issuer can make
interest payments to foreign investors free from a withholding tax,39 the
Antilles Treaty provided U.S. corporations with the perfect opportunity
to raise capital in the Eurobond Market by issuing debt through an
Antillean subsidiary and then borrowing that money from the subsidi-
ary."' U.S. corporations have used Antillean subsidiaries to issue many
35. Treasury Reports on Use of Caribbean Tax Havens, 22 TAX NOTES 165
(1984).
36. Dilworth, supra note 4, at 116 n.40; Renegotiated Netherlands-Netherlands
Antilles Treaty Will Increase the Tax Costs of the Two-Tier (Netherlands Antilles-
Netherlands) Holding Company Structure, 13 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 236 (1984). By
comparison, Swiss holding and domiciliary companies pay an overall tax rate of 14%,
which is considerably less than the standard corporate rate in Switzerland. Blackshaw,
supra note 16, at 77.
37. See Lashbrooke, Uncertainty in the Eurobond Market, 6 Loy. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 331, 349-50 (1983); see supra note 15 and accompanying text. Histori-
cally, offshore finance operations have contributed about 41% of the Antillean Govern-
ment's annual budget. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 100TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., REPORT OF THE DELEGATION TO SoUTH AMERICA 27 (Comm. Print 1987)
[hereinafter SOUTH AMERICAN DELEGATION REPORT] (statement of Prime Minister
Domenico Martina).
38. The Eurobond Market is made up of long-term loan transactions in which
unsecured corporate notes are issued to international investors. The typical Eurobond is
a bearer instrument generally in a $1000 denomination. The bearer bond form protects
the anonymity of the investor and provides for easy transfer. Under the Securities Act
of 1933, U.S. corporations cannot directly issue Eurobonds without registration with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. U.S. corporations can avoid SEC registration
and, prior to 1984, the 30% withholding tax for bonds that come to rest abroad by
issuing Eurobonds through Antillean finance subsidiaries. In this manner, U.S. corpo-
rations could generate capital in response to their needs without registration delays and
tax obstacles. In order to facilitate the sale, a parent corporation generally guarantees
the subsidiary's Eurobonds, and the Eurobonds are usually convertible into equity
shares of the parent. The risk of the Eurobond Market derives from potentially wide
fluctuations in Eurocurrency, which can cause an erratic market and an international
credit crunch. Lashbrooke, supra note 37, at 335-36; Irish, supra note 8, at 467-68.
39. Duncan & Pergam, Euromarket Participants Evaluate Treaty Revocation,
6 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 12, 12-13 (Aug. 1987). Without the guarantee of freedom from a
withholding tax, a bond issue would not be a profitable investment since many with-
holding tax-free issues are available on international capital markets. See id.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
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billions of dollars in Eurobonds since the early 1960s.41 In 1980, the
Eurobond Market constituted a little less than one-half of the world's
capital markets,42 but by 1982, it constituted over 60% of the world's
capital markets."' In recent years, U.S. corporations issued approxi-
mately equal amounts of debt in both the Eurobond and the domestic
markets."'
The U.S. Congress dealt a harsh blow to Antillean finance subsid-
iaries in 1984 when it repealed the withholding tax on portfolio indebt-
edness interest paid to foreigners." The repeal applied to two types of
debt: (1) certain unregistered bearer obligations (e.g. Eurobonds); and
(2) obligations which could verifiably be proven not to be owned by
U.S. persons."' The repeal removed the major incentive for using Antil-
lean finance subsidiaries to issue Eurobonds and effectively granted
U.S. corporations direct access to international capital markets.47
Harold Henriquez, the Antilles' former tax commissioner, warned
that the repeal of the withholding tax seriously threatened the economic
and political stability of the Antilles and that it could even cause the
41. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 201. Prior to 1974, the growth of the
Eurobond Market was spurred by the Treasury Department's program to prevent the
devaluation of the dollar by stopping capital outflows from the United States. The
Treasury Department encouraged U.S. corporations to borrow abroad and to close the
domestic capital market to foreign borrowers. For this reason, the IRS officially recog-
nized the use of offshore finance subsidiaries to avoid the withholding tax on portfolio
indebtedness. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-110, 1973-1 C.B. 454. In 1974, the Treasury
Department's program to support the dollar ended, and the IRS revoked its approval of
offshore finance subsidiary transactions. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-464, 1974-2 C.B. 47.
Despite its disapproval, the IRS has not challenged finance subsidiary arrangements.
After a slight decline, the Eurobond Market recovered in 1977 and has been growing
ever since. Irish, supra note 8, at 468.
42. See Dilworth, supra note 4, at 118.
43. Id. In 1980, $81.1 billion was invested in the world's capital markets ($42.6
billion in the Domestic Public Bond Market and $38.5 billion in the Eurobond/For-
eign Currency Bond Markets). In 1982, $110.7 billion was invested in the world's
capital markets ($37.5 billion in the Domestic Public Bond Market and $73.2 billion in
the Eurobond/Foreign Currency Bond Markets). 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at
595.
44. Lashbrooke, supra note 37, at 351.
45. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 127, 98 Stat. 494, 648-
53 (1984) (codified at I.R.C. § 871 (h) (Supp. III 1985)); see supra note 30 and ac-
companying text. Congress sought to increase net revenues by repealing the withhold-
ing tax, but in the process, it sacrificed over $500 million in annual revenue from the
withholding tax. Dilworth, supra note 4, at 111 n.6.
46. I.R.C. § 871(h)(2) (Supp. III 1985); Dilworth, supra note 4, at 117. "U.S.
persons" are citizens or residents of the United States. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (1982).
47. Dilworth, supra note 4, at 116. Steven Lainoff, former International Tax
Counsel for the Treasury Department, stated that the repeal of the withholding tax,
"'removed the need to keep the Antilles around' by promoting direct access to this
market [of foreign capital]." Johnson, supra note 5, at 129.
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overthrow of the Antillean Government by "leftist" groups. 8 Along
similar lines, some commentators have said that the repeal was incon-
sistent with the Caribbean Basin Initiative's purpose to stabilize the
Caribbean and to thwart political change in the region. 9 In an attempt
to dampen the effect of the repeal on the Antilles, Congress barred U.S.
corporations from redeeming Eurobonds issued before July 19, 1984.' 0
Most of the Antillean finance subsidiaries remained intact following the
withholding tax repeal despite their new found lack of utility."'
The Antilles' economy depends heavily on the operations of the
finance subsidiaries.52 U.S. corporations can still use the finance subsid-
iaries as established mechanisms for quickly raising capital despite the
repeal of the withholding tax. The Antillean finance subsidiaries are at
the heart of both the Antilles Treaty and the effects of its termination.53
The existence of these institutions is the direct result of the legitimate
use of the Antilles Treaty by U.S. corporations and foreign investors.54
In an attempt to end the problems that the Antilles Treaty posed for
U.S. tax policy, the Treaty's termination also attacked the legitimate
interests of the Antillean finance subsidiaries and their foreign
investors.
4. ABUSES OF THE ANTILLES TREATY
The Antilles Treaty caused two major problems for the United
States. First, U.S. persons could use the Antilles Treaty and the Is-
lands' domestic laws to evade taxes. Second, third-country residents
could use the Antilles Treaty for "treaty shopping."
4.1. Criminal Tax Evasion through the Antilles
U.S. citizens and residents could evade taxes by establishing in-
vestment companies or financial accounts in the Antilles and channeling
funds from U.S. sources through them.55 The funds would ultimately
be reinvested in U.S. real estate, securities or insurance, and the con-
junction of the Antilles Treaty and the Antillean commercial secrecy
48. Fialka, supra note 31, at 1, col. 6.
49. See, e.g., Dilworth, supra note 4, at 123.
50. Duncan & Pergam, supra note 39, at 12. The withholding tax repeal was
effective on July 18, 1984. Dilworth, supra note 4, at 116.
51. Duncan & Pergam, supra note 39, at 12. It should be noted that Antillean
subsidiaries could still be used to issue debt when U.S. corporations need immediate
capital without the delay of the SEC registration process. See supra note 38.
52. See SOUTH AMERICAN DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 37, at 27.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 131-35.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
55. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 570.
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laws5" would protect the beneficial owner's anonymity and shield the
income from IRS scrutiny.57 Thus, tax evasion was easily accomplished
due to the anonymity surrounding Antillean companies. 8 Over 25,000
corporations have been registered in the Antilles, but there is no indica-
tion of the number actually conducting business.59 Indirect evidence
suggests that many of these investment companies are owned by U.S.
persons.60
Once an investment company was established in the Antilles, it
could be used in various ways to evade taxes.8" The most common
method of tax evasion was "skimming profits" and sending cash re-
ceipts to the Antillean company without reporting them as income.62
The owner could make a simple payment to the Antillean company and
take an illegitimate deduction for a business expense.63 The taxpayer
56. See supra note 12.
57. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 570. For example, during the early 1980s,
the Industrial Concern & Investment Co. N.V. of Willemstad bought and then sold
3,000 acres of land in South Florida. The company made a $13 million profit from
these transactions, but the owners of the company were unknown. As a result, the IRS
has not determined whether any tax was ever paid on the income. Similar cases have
occurred in Georgia, Texas, Colorado, California and throughout Florida. Id. at 570,
703-25.
58. The process for establishing an investment company in the Antilles is very
simple. An investor contacts a lawyer who will in turn contact a trust company in the
Antilles. In most cases, the investor's name is not disclosed to the trust company. The
Antillean trust company prepares the incorporation documents, obtains the Antillean
Minister of Justice's approval of the articles of association, and arranges for the deed of
incorporation to be executed before a notary. The name of the beneficial owner need
not appear in the incorporation documents. Antillean law requires that the new com-
pany have two founders, a managing director, and a minimum of $6,000 in capital.
The Antillean trust company usually supplies the founders and the managing director.
Finally, the managing director must register the new company with the Chamber of
Commerce in Willemstad. After incorporation, the new company often maintains a re-
lationship with the trust company which may provide a mailing address, organize
shareholder and board of directors meetings, prepare tax returns and keep acccounting
records for the new company. In 1983, the costs of incorporation were less than $1,000
($600 notary fee, $60 Chamber of Commerce registration fee, $210 for publication of
the articles of association, $75 stamp duty for the Minister of Justice's "decree of no
objection," the cost of translating the deed of incorporation into Dutch, and a $17 an-
nual registration fee). Id. at 56-57.
59. Id. at 57-58.
60. Id. at 570; see supra note 46 (defining "U.S. persons").
61. In the United States, tax evasion is a crime punishable by up to five years
imprisonment or a $100,000 fine. I.R.C. § 7201 (1982).
62. Businesses and taxpayers with large cash flows are the primary ones who
skim profits. Such persons can skim profits by making a service contract with their
offshore companies and claiming that the payments are for services rendered. In reality,
the U.S. person performs the service and fraudulently takes a deduction for the pay-
ment to the offshore company. Workman, The Use of Offshore Tax Havens For the
Purpose of Criminally Evading Income Taxes, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675,
682-83 (1982).
63. If the taxpayer is audited, she can support the expense with a cancelled
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could also establish a foreign trust that would nominally own the Antil-
lean company and pay the taxpayer as the trust's beneficiary.64 The
individual alternatively could "launder" the funds by having the Antil-
lean company reinvest them in the United States without any detectable
connection to himself." The effectiveness of these methods depended on
the IRS' inability to obtain legally admissible evidence documenting the
connection between the taxpayers and the offshore funds. 6
In order to curb tax evasion, the United States needs meaningful
programs for the exchange of information with other countries.6 7 The
language in the Antilles Treaty's exchange of information provision 8 is
broad and ambiguous.6" In light of this ambiguity, the Antilles ex-
changed virtually no financial information with the IRS."° The combi-
nation of the Treaty's ambiguous provision, the lack of cooperation
from the Antillean Government and the Antillean commercial secrecy
laws"' made tax evasion through the Antilles a major problem for the
United States.72 However, termination of the Antilles Treaty does not
directly address this concern. Tax evasion was caused principally by
the secrecy laws and the anonymity of Antillean companies and only to
a small extent by the Antilles Treaty itself. 3 To truly reduce tax eva-
sion through the Antilles, the United States must implement a success-
ful mutual assistance agreement with the Islands regardless of the
check or a receipt from the Antillean company. The IRS cannot find out if the tax-
payer is related to the Antillean company due to the anonymity obstacle discussed in
supra note 58. Id. at 681-82.
64. It is almost impossible for the IRS to discover the existence of a foreign trust.
Id. at 683.
65. Funds can be "laundered" in many ways. The taxpayer could have the off-
shore company invest in U.S. securities through a blind trust. Alternatively, the tax-
payer could sell appreciated securities to the trust for an annuity with a carryover basis,
and when the trust sells the securities, the taxpayer would not realize an immediate
taxable gain. The taxpayer could also choose to invest in U.S. real estate through the
offshore company as described in supra note 57. These examples are only a few of the
simpler "laundering" schemes. Id. at 684-85.
66. See id. at 686.
67. "Adroit tax planners with knowledge of bank secrecy laws can structure
transactions that enforcement agencies could never document. The problem for the en-
forcement agencies is, thus, informational. The agencies must obtain evidence to con-
nect taxpayers with offshore funds in [a] legally admissible form." Id.
68. See supra text accompanying note 28.
69. "Exchange of information provisions in the existing tax treaties with tax
havens are simply inadequate because they do not override local bank or commercial
secrecy laws." Belotsky, supra note 6, at 81.
70. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 569.
71. See supra note 12.
72. See Lashbrooke, supra note 37, at 350.
73. See generally 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 569-70 (explaining that tax
evasion through the Antilles was facilitated by the Antillean laws and the lack of infor-
mation provided to the IRS).
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Treaty's existence. 4
The U.S. experience with Switzerland shows that tax evasion can
be addressed by a mutual assistance scheme between treaty partners.
The exchange of information provision in the Swiss Treaty is similar to
the provision in the Antilles Treaty.7 Under both treaties, the coun-
tries agreed to exchange information "for the prevention of fraud."7"
The Swiss Federal Supreme Court has held that Switzerland fulfills its
treaty obligation by merely providing the IRS with informational re-
ports without including documentary evidence.7 This interpretation
was problematic for the IRS because informational reports absent docu-
mentation are inadmissible as evidence in U.S. courts. 8
In 1977, the United States and Switzerland enacted the Treaty for
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters ("Mutual Assistance
Treaty"),"9 which required the exchange of information in cases where
the offense under investigation was a crime in both countries.8" How-
ever, Swiss law distinguishes between tax evasion, which is not a crime,
and tax fraud, which is a crime.8" As a result, the Mutual Assistance
Treaty generally has been construed to require the disclosure of infor-
mation only in organized crime cases.82 Further progress occurred in
1982 when the United States and Switzerland signed a Memorandum
of Understanding ("Memorandum"). 8" The Memorandum states that
under certain circumstances insider trading could be the predicate
crime for the compulsory disclosure of information under the Mutual
Assistance Treaty.84 The Memorandum also integrated the Private
Agreement Among Members of the Swiss Banker's Association, which
allowed for the disclosure of some information even absent a criminal
74. See generally Belotsky, supra note 6, at 81 (stating that mutual assistance
agreements are potentially the best way to curb tax evasion).
75. Swiss Treaty, supra note 19, art. XVI.
76. Id.; Antilles Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXI.
77. Mullhaupt, Seeking Swiss Assistance in Enforcing United States Tax Laws,
4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 144, 146 (1986).
78. Workman, supra note 62, at 703.
79. Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Swit-
zerland, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (entered into force Jan. 23, 1977).
80. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
81. Crinion, Information Gathering on Tax Evasion in Tax Haven Countries,
20 INT'L LAW. 1209, 1239-40 (1986). Under Swiss law, tax fraud involves only the
intentional falsification of documents, whereas tax evasion covers "willful failure to
make a return, willful misstatements on a return, or other deliberate efforts to obstruct
proper tax ... collection." Workman, supra note 62, at 703.
82. Mullhaupt, supra note 77, at 149.
83. Memorandum of Understanding, Aug. 31, 1982, United States-Switzerland,
22 I.L.M. I.
84. Id. art. II, para. 3(a)-(b); Crinion, supra note 81, at 1242.
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violation of Swiss law. 5
The Swiss example demonstrates that the United States must act
in concert with tax havens to stop tax evasion. Because of the commer-
cial secrecy laws and the anonymity surrounding Antillean compa-
nies,86 tax evasion through the Antilles will not disappear with the ter-
mination of the Antilles Treaty. Since U.S. persons can use the Antilles
for tax evasion with or without the Treaty's existence," its termination
does not solve the IRS' lack of information concerning offshore activi-
ties.88 In fact, the Treaty's termination may exacerbate the problem by
antagonizing the Antillean Government and making it even less cooper-
ative in the future.8 9
4.2. Treaty Shopping through the Antilles
Unlike tax evasion, treaty shopping in the Antilles was caused di-
rectly by the terms of the Antilles Treaty.90 Treaty shopping occurs
when a third-country individual uses a treaty country as an investment
conduit to obtain benefits that he was not intended to receive under the
treaty.9 Treaty shoppers ordinarily come from countries that tax on a
territorial basis (i.e. no tax is imposed on foreign source income).92 By
investing in U.S. stocks, bonds or real estate through an Antillean in-
vestment company, 93 a treaty shopper could take advantage of the An-
tilles Treaty to avoid U.S. taxation without the burden of any taxation
85. See supra note 84.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
87. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
89. While the United States has drafted effective exchange of information provi-
sions, it is very difficult to convince a tax haven to agree to the terms. For example, the
Caribbean Basin Initiative agreement provides for:
[T]he exchange of such information ... as may be necessary or appropri-
ate to carry out and enforce the tax laws of the United States and the
beneficiary country (whether criminal or civil proceedings), including in-
formation which may otherwise be subject to nondisclosure provisions of
the local law of the beneficiary country such as provisions respecting bank
secrecy and bearer shares.
I.R.C. § 274(h)(6)(C)(i) (Supp. III 1985).
90. A third-country resident could invest through an Antillean company and use
the Antilles Treaty to avoid U.S. tax on interest, dividends, real estate capital gains and
royalties. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 570.
91. Johnson, supra note 5, at 129; Irish, supra note 8, at 471; see Belotsky,
supra note 6, at 70 ("Successful treaty shopping generally consists of three elements:
(1) a reduction of source country taxation; (2) a low or zero effective rate of tax in the
payee country; and (3) a low or zero rate of tax on payments from the payee treaty
country to the taxpayer.").
92. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 570. Two-thirds of the Latin American
countries tax on a territorial basis. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
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in his country of residence.94 Of all the U.S. tax treaties, the Antilles
Treaty was the most widely employed for treaty shopping.9 5
The problem with treaty shopping is that it discourages countries
without tax treaties from entering into treaties with the United States.9 6
These countries have little incentive to negotiate with the United States.
Their residents can receive unintended benefits under existing U.S.
treaties, and they need not make any concessions to the United States in
return. Treaty shopping also creates a disincentive for countries such as
the Antilles to renegotiate outdated tax treaties with the United States,
because their residents benefit from the commerce generated by treaty
shopping activities.9 7 As a result, treaty shopping weakens the U.S.
treaty program and hurts the Treasury Department's ability to main-
tain the competitive position of the United States in international in-
vestment markets.9 8
Treaty shopping can be prevented by various methods:99 (1) a
treaty provision excluding holding companies and their shareholders
from treaty benefits;' (2) direct source country taxation;' 0 ' (3) a sec-
ondary withholding tax;'0 2 and (4) the termination of the abused
treaty.'0 3 In an attempt to impede treaty shopping in the Antilles, the
94. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 570; see Irish, supra note 8, at 471.
95. Baker Explains U.S. Position on Netherlands Antilles Treaty Negotiations,
36 TAx NOTES 92 (1987) (statement of Treasury Secretary James Baker in a letter
dated June 24, 1987 to Representative William Gray (D-Pa.)) [hereinafter Baker Ex-
plains U.S. Position]. In several Letter Rulings issued during the Carter Administra-
tion, the IRS tacitly approved treaty shopping transactions. See 1983 Hearings, supra
note 4, at 521 (discussing Letter Rulings 77-23-035, 77-39-080, 77-42-048 and 77-42-
058).
96. Baker Explains U.S. Position, supra note 95, at 92.
97. Id.
98. "Treaty shopping undermines our ability to negotiate or renegotiate treaties
to assist the international competitive position of United States businesses." Id.
99. Comment, Income Tax Treaty Shopping: An Overview of Prevention Tech-
niques, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 626, 650 (1983).
100. Id. A limitation of benefits provision which excludes holding companies
(e.g. Antillean investment companies) and their shareholders from treaty benefits, is the
most common method of curtailing treaty shopping. Belotsky, supra note 6, at 83. The
United States-Luxembourg Treaty includes such an anti-holding company provision.
Income Tax Convention, Dec. 18, 1962, United States-Luxembourg, art. XV, 15
U.S.T. 2355, T.I.A.S. No. 5726. In 1980, the Antilles received over 800% more U.S.
source income than Luxembourg, a noted tax haven itself. Comment, supra note 99, at
639.
101. Comment, supra note 99, at 650. A taxpayer's country of residence usually
has the primary right to tax his income.
102. Id. For example, the United States could impose a withholding tax on the
interest paid by an Antillean investment company to a foreign investor in addition to a
primary withholding tax on the interest paid by the U.S. corporation to the Antillean
investment company.
103. Id. "It is the policy of [the Reagan] administration not to enter into new
treaties which permit ... benefits to residents of third countries and, as appropriate, to
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Treasury Department negotiated new treaties with the Antilles and
Aruba... ("New Treaties") which were signed in August 1986.105
The New Treaties included an anti-treaty shopping provision that
restricted third-country persons from receiving treaty benefits except for
two discrete types of income.1" 6 First, payments from international mu-
tual funds established in the Antilles or the United States were entitled
to treaty benefits regardless of the investor's residence.1 07 Second, quali-
fied foreign real estate companies could either receive a waiver of the
secondary withholding tax on dividends or elect to be treated as a do-
mestic corporation thereby obtaining nondiscriminatory treatment with
respect to the interest they received."0 ' In addition, the New Treaties
addressed other items that were intended to enhance the Antilles' status
as an international financial center while reducing its stature as a tax
haven.1o9
The ratification of the New Treaties hit an obstacle when Con-
gress passed the Tax Reform Act of 1986.11 The Antilles and the
United States had agreed to reopen negotiations if Congress subse-
quently passed legislation that would materially affect the balance of
benefits under the New Treaties.111 The Tax Reform Act may have
substantially reduced the benefits for Antillean real estate companies,
because it instituted a 30% branch profits tax on foreign entities that
conduct business in the United States but do not reinvest their earnings
renegotiate, or, if necessary, to terminate existing treaties to accomplish this objective."
Chapoton Authors Treasury Policy on Treaty Shopping, 19 TAX NOTES 249 (1983).
104. See supra note 4 (discussing Aruba's independent status).
105. U.S. Signs New Income Tax Treaties With the Netherlands Antilles and
Aruba, 32 TAx NOTES 631 (1986) (the treaties have not been ratified); Convention for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Aug. 8, 1986,
United States-Netherlands Antilles (obtainable from Tax Notes Complete Access Ser-
vice, Document No. 86-5458); Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Aug. 9, 1986, United States-Aruba (obtainable from
Tax Notes Complete Access Service, Document No. 86-5509) [hereinafter New Trea-
ties](the provisions cited infra are identical in both documents).
106. New Treaties, supra note 105, art. 16.
107. Id. art. 16, para. 5.
108. Id. art. 16, para. 6.
109. The New Treaties provided a twelve month grandfather clause for benefits
received under the Antilles Treaty and a permanent grandfather clause for Eurobonds
issued before the repeal of the withholding tax on July 18, 1984. Id. art. 28, paras. 5 &
6. The New Treaties also provided benefits for Antillean insurance and reinsurance
companies. Id. art. 18. Finally, the New Treaties contained an elaborate exchange of
information provision to address tax evasion. Id. art. 26.
110. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws (100 Stat.) 2085.
111. Forry & Karlin, 1986 Act: Overrides, Conflicts, and Interactions With
U.S. Income Tax Treaties, 35 TAX NOTES 793, 797-98 (1987).
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in their U.S. enterprise." 2 In light of this new tax, the Antilles and the
United States reopened negotiations on the New Treaties, and the
Treasury Department began to consider the option of terminating the
Antilles Treaty altogether."'
5. TERMINATION OF THE ANTILLES TREATY
On May 28, 1987, Treasury Secretary James Baker notified An-
tillean Prime Minister Domenico Martina that the United States
would proceed to terminate the Antilles Treaty and suspend negotia-
tions on the New Treaties. 1 The Treasury Department also rejected
the Antilles' final three proposals that the Islands thought would make
the New Treaties worthwhile for both parties.11 On June 29, the An-
tilles was told that the Antilles Treaty would be terminated on January
1, 1988.116
The Treasury Department announced the introduction of legisla-
112. See Baker Explains U.S. Position, supra note 95, at 92; Forry & Karlin,
supra note 111, at 797. The 1986 Tax Reform Act places a 30% tax on a foreign
corporation's "dividend equivalent amount" (profits adjusted by any increases or de-
creases in U.S. net equity). I.R.C. § 884(a) (West 1987). Subsequent to the reopening
of negotiations on the New Treaties, the IRS issued Notice 87-56 which listed the
Antilles as a country whose qualified residents are not subject to the new branch profits
tax. I.R.S. Notice 87-56, 1987-35 I.R.B. 9. For a discussion of Notice 87-56 and its
effects on U.S. treaties, see Plutte, Notice 87-56, The Interaction of Branch Profits
Tax and Tax Treaties, 17 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 31 (1988).
113. See Netherlands Antilles Treaty Negotiations Stalled; Congress Gets into
the Act. 35 TAX NOTES 1167 (1987) [hereinafter Netherlands Antilles Treaty Negotia-
tions Stalled].
114. Netherlands Antilles Says U.S. Treaty Proposals Are Unacceptable, 35
TAX NoTES 1112 (1987). At roughly the same time as Secretary Baker's notification,
two international tax lawyers wrote that, "[tIhe treaty as a whole could not be termi-
nated unilaterally as a practical matter .... ." Forry & Karlin, supra note 111, at 797.
115. Netherlands Antilles Treaty Negotiations Stalled, supra note 113, at 1167.
The Antilles' first proposal would have allowed Antillean corporations to issue debt
free of U.S. tax. Id. The second proposal involved increasing the benefits for Antillean
real estate companies by treating the interest in Antillean partnerships as non-U.S.
assets and therefore exempt from U.S. estates tax. Id. The Antilles' final proposal
would have permitted a corporation to qualify for treaty benefits if its owners qualified
personally (i.e. if they were residents of either country). Id. The United States rejected
these proposals because it felt that its prior concessions to the Antilles were sufficient to
make the New Treaties viable. See id.
116. International Tax Developments, supra note 2, at 455. One international
tax lawyer commented that, "[f]rom a tax policy point of view, termination made immi-
nent [sic] sense .... Why have a treaty with the world?" Johnson, supra note 5, at
129. On the other hand, Richard M. Hammer, the Chairman of the Committee on
Taxation of the U.S. Council on International Business, wrote a letter to Secretary
Baker stating that the U.S. actions showed "an obvious disdain for its treaty obligations
and that termination of the Antilles tax treaty was an example of Treasury 'taking its
ball and going home,' because the Antilles didn't want to play the game Treasury's
way." Id.
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tion on July 2, 1987 that would maintain the withholding tax exemp-
tion for foreign investors holding Eurobonds issued before July 18,
1984, the effective date of the withholding tax repeal.117 On July 10,
the Treasury Department retreated further and notified the Antilles
that the Treaty's exemption for interest paid to Antillean residents118
would not be terminated with the rest of the Antilles Treaty.'1" The
awkward nature of the termination process may be attributable to the
potentially profound effects that the Treaty's demise holds for the
Eurobond Market, the Antilles and the United States.
5.1. Effects of the Termination on the Eurobond Market
After the original termination announcement on June 29, the in-
ternational bond market dropped drastically, especially the prices of
bonds issued before mid-1984.2 The decline was caused by the exis-
tence of bond redemption clauses, which generally allow for the re-
demption of an issue if the "tax regime in place at the time of issuance
changes."'' The problem was that Eurobonds were selling at substan-
tial premiums due to the higher interest rates at which they had origi-
nally been issued; and therefore, corporations could redeem the bonds
at par value while refinancing their debt at the lower prevailing inter-
est rates.' 22 If many corporations took advantage of this opportunity
during the summer of 1987, millions and possibly billions of dollars
would have been eliminated from the holdings of investors in the
United States and abroad.'23
117. Treasury Moves To Modify Antilles Treaty Termination Notice, But Is It
Legal?, 36 TAX NOTES 245 (1987) [hereinafter Treasury Moves To Modify]; see supra
note 50 and accompanying text. The Treasury Department proposed this bill because
the termination of the Treaty would have effectively cancelled the exemption. Johnson,
supra, note 5, at 128.
118. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
119. Treasury Moves To Modify, supra note 117, at 245.
120. The Antilles Heel, L.A. Daily J., July 17, 1987, at 4, col. 1. On the first
day after the announcement, convertible bond issues dropped $50-60 for every $1,000
of face value, and similar declines occurred in straight debt and zero-coupon debt is-
sues. U.S. Is Ending 1948 Tax Treaty With the Antilles, Wall St. J., June 30, 1987,
at 7, col. 3. For example, the price of zero-coupon bonds with a $1,000 face value from
a $350 million issue of J.C. Penny l orp. maturing in 1994 fell $140 from $535 to
$395 in one day. U.S. Tax Treaty Action "Calculated Decision", Fin. Times, July 1,
1987, at 33, col. 4.
121. Johnson, supra note 5, at 128. There are a wide variety of tax redemption
clauses for bonds, and accordingly, some issues are more susceptible than others to
quick redemption upon the termination of a tax treaty. Duncan & Pergam, supra note
39, at 13.
122. Wall St. J., supra note 120, at 7, col. 3; L.A. Daily J., supra note 120, at
4, col. 1.
123. Wall St. J., supra note 120, at 7, col. 3. Salomon Brothers estimated that
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The June 29th termination caused a few corporations to announce
their intentions to redeem pre-July 1984 Eurobond issues, and one
even made a second formal announcement.12 4 In response to this situa-
tion, the Treasury Department made the July 2nd legislative proposal
and subsequently the July 10th modification of the Treaty's termina-
tion. " ' The modification restored the tax regime that was in place
when the Eurobonds in question were issued, thereby restoring the ma-
turity expectation in approximately $32 billion of Eurobonds.
26
The unfortunate effect on the international capital market sprung
from the manner of termination and not from the fact of termination
itself. The abrogation of the entire Antilles Treaty on June 29, 1987
exhibited either a tremendous callousness or an extraordinary naivete
on the part of the Treasury Department concerning the predictable
repercussions in the Eurobond Market. In taking the position that U.S.
tax policy takes precedence over the concerns of the international capi-
tal market, 2 7 the Treasury Department ignored the reality that corpo-
rate finance occurs on the international level today and that the benefits
available under tax treaties directly affect the way investors choose to
invest their money.'12  "In all of this ... no one bothers to think about
350 bond issues, with a total value of $32 billion, were affected by the termination of
the Antilles Treaty. Id. However, it should be noted that this figure represents only a
minority of the total Eurobond Market. Johnson, supra note 5, at 128; see supra note
43 and accompanying text.
124. Are Issuers Ready For Standard Tax Redemption Clauses?, 6 INT'L FIN.
L. REV. 6 (1987) (also stating that issuers are required to make three formal announce-
ments before bonds can be redeemed) [hereinafter Are Issuers Ready].
125. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
126. Duncan & Pergam, supra note 39, at 12. The termination of the Antilles
Treaty caused many in the international financial community to call for the introduc-
tion of new bond redemption clauses that could not be invoked because of the caprice of
some government. Id. The International Primary Market Association's Legal and Doc-
umentation Committee drafted a model redemption clause and general guidelines for
future redemption clauses in order to prevent the type of mass refinancing that the
Eurobond Market almost witnessed in the summer of 1987. Are Issuers Ready, supra
note 124, at 6.
127. Fin. Times, supra note 120, at 33, col. 8.
128.
Policy makers must realize that corporate finance is international finance
and that international finance should not be frustrated by the regulatory
scheme of any state, particularly if that scheme is not subscribed to by
other participating states. The United States is a part of the international
financial community and must be a responsible member of that
community.
Lashbrooke, supra note 37, at 352. F.P. Robert van Nouhuys, the Economic Minister
of the Netherlands Embassy in Washington, D.C., has called U.S. unilateralism, "[one
of the] greatest obstacles to solving the current morass in the ongoing U.S.-Netherlands
Antilles tax treaty termination dispute." Bergherm Discusses Double Taxation Dis-
putes; Netherlands Official Decries U.S. Unilateralism, 37 TAx NOTES 579, 580
(1987).
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the needs of markets . . . for foreign investors or America's interest in
attracting foreign capital."12
While the modification of the termination on July 10, 1987 pre-
vented an explosion of bond redemption, it nonetheless raised the ques-
tion of exactly where U.S. tax policy stands on the issue of the stability
of the international capital market. The ability of U.S. corporations to
raise capital internationally is intimately related to the credibility and
the consistency of U.S. tax policy abroad. As one editorial bluntly
stated, "the fecklessness of the abrogation [of the Antilles Treaty]
stands as a warning to any future investor in the U.S."'3 °
5.2. Effects of the Termination on the Antilles
The revocation of the Treaty is likely to have a substantial impact
on the Antilles' economy. The Islands have three basic industries: tour-
ism,"' oil refining," 2 and international finance. Since the withholding
tax repeal in 1984,' business activity in the Antilles has dropped 40%
and unemployment has been as high as 28%.' 13 In April 1987, Prime
Minister Martina predicted that revenue produced by offshore finance
operations in the Antilles would decrease more than 15% over the fol-
lowing three years.' 35 However, that figure appears very conservative
after the end of the Antilles Treaty.
The termination may also affect the political climate in the Is-
lands. Some observers see the Antilles as a target for Cuban aggression
and a Marxist takeover.1 6 In recognition of the Antilles' strategic sig-
nificance, the Treasury Department worked closely with the State De-
partment during the negotiations on the New Treaties.13 7 Senator
Thomas A. Daschle (D-S. Dak.) warned Secretary Baker in the spring
of 1987 that if the United States did not provide economic benefits to
129. L.A. Daily J., supra note 120, at 4, col. 2.
130. Id.
131. The recession of 1982-83 hit the Antilles' tourist industry very hard. Vene-
zuela was the major source of tourists. The Venezuelan bolivar was devalued from
$0.45 to $0.10 during the recession, and the Antilles experienced a corresponding drop
in Venezuelan tourism. SOUTH AMERICAN DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 37, at
26.
132. Shell, the largest company which refined oil in the Antilles, closed its refin-
ery on Curacao in 1986 after 70 years of operation. Id.
133. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
134. SOUTH AMERICAN DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 37, at 26. The larg-
est drydock in the Western Hemisphere is located on Curacao, but after the departure
of Shell and the recession, drydock operations dropped 40% and employee wages
dropped 20%. Id.
135. Id. at 27.
136. Dilworth, supra note 4, at 118.
137. Baker Explains U.S. Position, supra note 95, at 92.
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the Antilles through the New Treaties then it may be forced to supply
military aid in the future. 13 8 The threat of a Marxist government sit-
ting in Willemstad may have been exaggerated. The Antillean economy
is overwhelmingly capitalistic due to the Treaty with the United States,
and the Islands are strong political allies of the Western democracies.1"9
However, the United States does have an interest in the Antilles' politi-
cal stability, and that stability was placed in at least some jeopardy by
the termination of the Antilles Treaty.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative ("CBI") may be the logical solu-
tion to the problems of the Antilles' economic woes and potential politi-
cal instability. 4 When Congress passed the CBI in 1983, the Antilles
hoped that it would help their economy by opening U.S. markets, but
the CBI has actually provided few benefits for the Islands. 4 A country
with a large service based economy such as the Antilles receives little
help under the terms of the CBI."" In addition, the Antilles' only ma-
jor product, refined oil, is expressly excluded from the ambit of the
CBI. 43 Therefore, the economic and political fallout from the termina-
tion of the Antilles Treaty cannot be addressed adequately by the CBI
in its current state. Without such an instrument to help the Antilles,
138. Netherlands Antilles Treaty Negotiations Stalled, supra note 113, at 1168.
139.
[I]n many cases, the ties [between tax havens and Western industrialized
countries] stem principally from the haven status of the tax havens, radical
measures by the industrialized countries to eliminate or minimize the use
of tax havens may have a corrosive effect on these ties and may lead to
destabilization of the very governments which are staunch allies of the
industrialized countries.[sic] As a consequence, the interests of the indus-
trialized countries clearly cannot be defined exclusively in economic terms.
There is a significant political dimension that requires careful
consideration.
Irish, supra note 8, at 486.
140. The purpose of the Caribbean Basin Initiative is to stimulate investment
and trade between the United States and the countries of the Caribbean, Central
America and South America. The theory behind the CBI is that a strong economy
provides a strong barrier against political change. Dilworth, supra note 4, at 114.
141. SouTH AMERICAN DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 37, at 26 (statement
of J.A.O. Bikker, President of the Antillean legislature).
142. Id. In order to really benefit from the CBI, a country must have some tan-
gible products to trade with the United States. The Antilles has virtually no agricul-
ture; only 5% of the total land area is arable, and the only agricultural products of note
are pigs and goats. 1983 Hearings, supra note 4, at 794. (Phosphate is the only natu-
ral resource in any abundance on the Antilles.).
143. Prime Minister Martina told a delegation of Congressmen in April 1987
that the Antilles' economy would be helped greatly if the CBI considered oil and re-
fined products. SOUTH AMERICAN DELEGATION REPORT, supra note 37, at 27. In the
past, the Antilles refined approximately one million barrels of oil each day almost ex-
clusively for U.S. consumption; but by the Spring of 1987, the rate was down to
200,000 barrels each day. Id.
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the termination will have a profound economic effect on the Islands,
and it could potentially have an equally dramatic political effect.
5.3. Effects of the Termination on the United States
The effects of the Treaty's abrogation on the U.S. Government are
uncertain. U.S. tax revenues from Antillean investments in the United
States will increase, but the magnitude of the increase cannot accurately
be estimated.' The termination should have no significant effect on
the IRS'ability to combat tax evasion in the Antilles because that prob-
lem is caused by the Antilles' domestic laws. 4 The end of treaty shop-
ping through the Antilles.46 will help the Treasury Department negoti-
ate new tax treaties and potentially bolster the competitive position of
U.S. corporations in the future.'47 However, the termination alterna-
tively may create a chilling effect on the ability of U.S. corporations to
raise capital in international markets.' 48 If the international investment
community perceives U.S. tax policy to be inconsistent,'49 the termina-
tion of the Antilles Treaty may actually hurt the international competi-
tive position of U.S. corporations. 50 While the termination's effects on
the United States should be significant, they will not be nearly as dra-
matic as the effects on the Antilles.
6. ALTERNATIVES TO THE TERMINATION OF THE ANTILLES
TREATY
In 1981, the IRS outlined the considerations which shape the U.S.
tax policy on income tax treaties:
(1) Maintaining the competitive position of the United States
investing abroad or exporting;
(2) Maintaining tax equity as between investments in the
United States and investments abroad;
144. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 73, 86-88 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
148. "If this scenario comes to pass, companies then would be forced to go to the
domestic market to raise needed funds, a market which is already saturated by the
Federal government . . . ." Johnson, supra note 5, at 128.
149. See generally supra text accompanying notes 121-23 (explaining that inves-
tors' expectations depend on the maintenance of a consistent tax regime).
150. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. "This is exactly opposite of
what ought to be the thrust of American policy. An administration with the values of
President Reagan's should be out trying to break down the barriers to capital. It should
be easing the access of U.S. corporations and citizens to foreign capital." L.A. Daily J.,
supra note 120, at 4. col. 2; but cf. supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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(3) The need to provide fair rules for taxing foreign
investments;
(4) Administrative efficiency;
(5) Foreign policy considerations;
(6) Promotion of investment in the U.S. 5'
From this standpoint, the termination of the Antilles Treaty appears to
be both a triumph and a failure of tax policy. The triumph consists of
two elements. First, the termination takes a small step towards frustrat-
ing criminal tax evasion by eliminating the generous benefits provided
under the Treaty.' 2 Second, the termination permanently solves the
problem of treaty shopping through the Antilles.'53
The termination's failure is not as apparent, but in many ways it
is more significant. Some argue that the policy of preventing tax eva-
sion and treaty shopping should be paramount."' However, that posi-
tion is too parochial to carry the day in a world of international eco-
nomic and political networking. Like many areas, tax policy naturally
develops into a balance.' 55 In the case of the Antilles Treaty, one side
of the balance contains the Treaty's abuses, which were only exacer-
bated by the uncooperative and often greedy nature of the Antilles Gov-
ernment.1 56 The other side holds the economic-political stability of the
Antilles, the confidence of the international investment community, and
in some ways, the integrity of U.S. tax policy itself.' 57 The failure
emerges from the fact that the Treaty's termination overwhelmingly
struck the balance in favor of discrete U.S. interests instead of broader
international concerns.
The failure of tax policy is further illuminated if one considers the
alternatives that were available. The United States could have done
nothing. Such inaction would have perpetuated the old abuses of tax
evasion and treaty shopping in the Antilles.' 58 The tax losses from
those activities still could not have been measured.' 59 The inaction also
would have buttressed and perhaps even augmented the international
investment community's confidence in the stability of the U.S. tax sys-
151. Belotsky, supra note 6, at 97.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 69-73; but cf. supra text accompanying
note 89.
153. See supra text accompanying note 90.
154. See Fin. Times, supra note 120, at 33, col. 8; Baker Explains U.S. Posi-
tion, supra note 95, at 92.
155. See Belotsky, supra note 6, at 97.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70 & 90.
157. See supra notes 128-39 and accompanying text.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 72 & 90.
159. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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tem. This confidence would have been beneficial to U.S. corporations
that need access to foreign capital.160 The resulting foreign investments
may have provided U.S. corporations with many billions of dollars each
year." In addition, inaction would have helped to maintain the eco-
nomic and political structure of the Antilles.' 2
The United States could have terminated the Antilles Treaty after
finishing negotiations and ratification of the New Treaties. This alter-
native would have substantially decreased tax evasion and treaty shop-
ping, but neither would have been totally eliminated.163 In enacting the
New Treaties, the United States would have told the international in-
vestment community that U.S. tax policy was consistent, fluid and re-
sponsive to international concerns. This alternative also would have
provided the Antilles with the opportunity to maintain its stature as a
financial center through real estate, mutual fund and insurance
activities.""
The United States could have terminated the Antilles Treaty and
somehow made the Caribbean Basin Initiative a viable opportunity for
the Antilles. 6 ' Such action would have indicated that the United States
was concerned about the future of its allies, regardless of their size.
This alternative would have benefited both the United States and the
Antilles, which thereby could maintain its identity as a successful capi-
talist democracy.' 66
On balance, any of these alternatives would have been preferable
to the outright termination of the Antilles Treaty. In conjunction with
an effective exchange of information program, these alternatives would
have sufficiently satisfied the Treasury Department's concerns while si-
multaneously serving the broader international interests.'6 Even with-
out an exchange of information program, each of them would have re-
sponded in some degree to the interests of the United States, the
Antilles and the international investment community.
160. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 131-39.
163. See supra notes 105-06 & 109 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 140.
167. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Exchanged information can de-
tect treaty shopping activities in addition to tax evasion. See generally Comment, supra
note 99, at 629-30 (stating that treaty shopping can be combated by IRS information
gathering).
[Vol. 10:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss3/5
U.S.-ANTILLES TAX CONVENTION
7. CONCLUSION
Under the Antilles Treaty, the Antilles' relationship with the
United States was often strained. The Treaty allowed the Antilles to
become the major international locus for treaty shopping. Tax evasion
through the Antilles was another significant problem for the United
States. While the Antillean commercial secrecy laws and the anonymity
of Antillean companies directly caused tax evasion opportunities, the
Treaty's ambiguous exchange of information provision did not help the
United States to minimize the problem. In response to these abuses, the
New Treaties were signed with the hope of strengthening the relation-
ship between the two countries. However, the New Treaties were side-
tracked by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the United States was
forced to find another solution for the problems of the Antilles Treaty.
Unfortunately, when the situation became difficult, the United
States chose simple abrogation seemingly without recognition of the ac-
tual interests involved in the decision. The effects of that decision on
the Antilles, the Eurobond Market and the international investment
community expose the termination as a failure of U.S. tax policy. The
failure itself is not that the United States acted to end the abuses of the
Antilles Treaty, but that the United States proceeded in a myopic man-
ner in order to achieve its goal.
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